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From Inborn Skills to Cantor’s Paradise1
Introduction: The Mathematical Subject
When one contemplates the history of the philosophy of mathe­matics, three kinds of mathematical subjects – i.e. subjects 
capable of carrying out mathematical reasoning – may be identified: 
the Platonic, the transcendental and the empirical.2 The Platonic 
subject has the ability to ‘see’ mathematical objects, which belong 
to an independent, eternal reality. A ‘strong’ Platonic subject (God?) 
is capable of perceiving all the mathematical world at once, and so is 
capable of contemplating actual infinity; the ‘weak’ Platonic subject 
has some cognitive access to the mathematical universe – through 
some special faculty of mind such as intuition – but not all-encom- 
passing.
The second kind of mathematical subject is the transcendental, 
a conception advocated vividly by Immanuel Kant and his follow­
ers (who include the most important philosophers of mathematics, 
  1 The publication of this paper was made possible through the support of a grant “The 
Limits of Scientific Explanation” from the John Templeton Foundation. It is largely 
based on, and summarizes some parts of, the argument developed in B. Brożek, Rule- 
­following. From Imitation to the Normative Mind, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 
2013.
  2 See A. Olszewski, Teza  Churcha.  Kontekst  historyczno­filozoficzny, Universitas, 
Kraków 2009, chapter 6.2, passim.
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such as Brouwer, and – with some reservations – even Hilbert). The 
trans cendental subject constructs mathematical objects, and so – in 
a way – they are not independent of it. However, the use of the word 
‘construct’ may be misleading here. The transcendental subject is not 
a physically existing – nor physically realizable – entity. It is an ideal 
projection of human mathematical capacities. In other words, the tran­
scendental subject stands vis a vis the entire body of possible mathe­
matical knowledge; it is a postulate of what can be done in mathe­
matics, disregarding any physical limitations such as time or space. 
Thus, when we speak of ‘constructions of mathematical objects’, we 
are referring to what is constructable in principle, not actually. To put 
it in a different way: human mathematical practice not only can never 
transgress the boundaries set by the ideal of the transcendental sub­
ject, but it also can never reach them. Because of its characteristics, 
the transcendental subject cannot perceive (construct) actual infinity, 
but is capable of grasping potential infinity.
Finally, there exists the notion of an empirical mathematical sub­
ject, i.e. someone whose mathematical capacities are limited by spa­
tio-temporal boundaries. For instance, a universal Turing machine is 
not a model of an empirical subject, as it utilizes an infinite tape and 
is capable of repeating its simple operations a number of times which 
is beyond the reach of any spatio-temporally limited agent.
It is my claim that – despite some attempts of the representa­
tives of psychologism and similar stances – most of the philosophies 
of mathematics developed during the previous 200 years presuppose 
a Platonic or transcendental view of the mathematical subject. This 
is, naturally, an oversimplification, but since the rejection of psycho-
logism at the turn of the 20th century, the abilities of mathematical 
subjects (e.g., Brouwer’s creative subject, or the subject capable of 
manipulating symbols within Hilbert’s formal systems) have always 
been understood in a non-empirical way. The spectacular advances in 
the neuroscientific studies of mathematical skills, achieved during the 
last two decades require, however, a re-thinking of the problem of the 
mathematical subject. So: is the empirical subject back?
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In what follows I will sketch a conception of mathematics that is 
suggested by recent scientific findings. I will also identify some chal­
lenges to this view, and argue for a Popperian ontology of mathemat­
ics. I will conclude with an answer to the question posed at the end of 
the previous paragraph.
1. The Number Sense or the ‘Embrained’ Mathematics
During the last twenty years or so, a number of neuroscientific stud­
ies have been devoted to uncovering the origins of human mathe­
matical capacities. The experiments in question include preferential 
looking, habituation of looking time, anticipatory head turning, ex­
planatory reaching, neuroimaging with EEG or fMRI, but also the 
careful study of the mathematical skills of various animals (birds, 
non-human primates).3
To illustrate: an experiment of Izard et al. had the following set­
ting: newborns were presented with a series of syllable trains of vari­
ous pitch and duration. Half of the participants were exposed to 4-syl­
lable trains, the other half – to 12-syllable trains. After a two minute 
time interval the infants were shown screens with visual arrays con­
sisting of 4 or 12 objects. Their times of looking at the screen were 
recorded. It proved that they tended to look longer at the visual arrays 
that correspond to an ongoing sound sequence.4
Another example are the classical experiments of Starkey and 
Cooper. Infants were shown consecutive slides with two dots, but 
differing in size and the distance between them. The experimenters 
measured fixation time of the infants, i.e. the time they spent looking 
at a new slide. After a while the fixation times decreased – the new 
slides with two dots were looked at for shorter periods. Then, without 
  3 Cf. E.S. Spelke, Natural  Number  and  Natural  Geometry, [in:] Space,  Time  and 
Number  in  the Brain, eds. S. Dehaene, E. Brannon, Academic Press, London 2011, 
pp. 287–317.
  4 Ibid., p. 310.
72 Bartosz Brożek
a warning, slides with three dots appeared, and the infants exhibited 
longer fixation times, which suggested that they could perceive the 
difference between two and three.5
Yet another example of studying infants’ mathematical abili­
ties consisted in placing two puppets on a stage, covering them with 
a screen, and then visibly removing one of the puppets. When the 
screen was lowered and there was only one puppet, infants expressed 
no surprise; however, if there were still two puppets, the fixation time 
was longer, suggesting that the infants were surprised by what they 
saw.6
These and other results suggest that there exists an inborn capac­
ity to ‘deal’ with small numbers; that this capacity is cross-modal (i.e., 
it ‘extracts’ numerosity independent of the mode of presentation – in­
fants ‘know’ that three dots and three spoken syllables share the same 
numerosity); and that it enables understanding of simple mathemati­
cal operations performed on small numbers (addition or subtraction).
In fact, the current research implies that two separate brain sys­
tems are responsible for these capacities: the object tracking system 
(OTS) and the approximate number system (ANS). OTS is a system 
that enables tracking multiple individuals (up to 3 or 4). It is based on 
the principles of cohesion (moving objects are recognized as bounded 
wholes), continuity (objects move on unobstructed paths) and con­
tact (objects do not interact at a distance).7 The existence of the OTS 
system is confirmed by a number of tests, including visual short-term 
memory tasks, multiple-objects tracking tasks, or enumeration tasks. 
The last kind of tests confirms human ability of subitizing, i.e. of an 
instant and highly accurate determination of a number of object in 
small collections (3–4), even presented very briefly.8 Furthermore, 
  5 Cf. G. Lakoff, R. Núñez, Where Mathematics Comes From, Basic Books, New York 
2000, p. 16.
  6 Ibid.
  7 M. Piazza, Neurocognitive Start­Up Tools  for Symbolic Number Representations, 
[in:] Space, Time and Number…, op.cit., p. 270.
  8 Ibid., p. 271.
73Neuroscience and Mathematics
it is speculated that the posterior parietal and occipital regions of the 
brain play the crucial role in the performance of such task, which sug­
gests that these regions are the location of OTS.9
ANS, on the other hand, is a system for representing the ap­
proximate number of items in sets. It works according to the famous 
Weber’s Law: the threshold of discrimination between two stimuli 
increases linearly with stimulus intensity. The law postulates a log­
arithmic relation between the physical stimulus and its internal rep­
resentation. In the case of ANS, the Weber fraction, or the smallest 
variation to a quantity that can be readily perceived, changes over hu­
man development. For newborns it is 1:3, for 6-month-old babies it 
is 1:2, for 1-year-old children it is 2:3, for a 4-year-old it is 3:4, for 
a 7-year-old it is 4:5, while for a 20-year-old it is 7:8. It means that 
a newborn can discriminate between 1 and 3, or 2 and 6, or 10 and 30, 
but not 1 and 2, 2 and 5, or 10 and 27. Four-year-old children can tell 
that there is a difference in numerosity between sets consisting of 6 
and 8 or 12 and 16 elements, but not 7 and 8 or 12 and 15. An adults’ 
ANS system is even more ‘sensitive’: they can discriminate (without 
counting) between sets consisting of 14 and 16 elements or 70 and 80 
elements, but not 70 and 78 elements. It is quite well established that 
ANS is located in the mid-intreparietal sulcus.10
One important difference between OTS and ANS must be noted 
here. ANS may be considered a core system dedicated to numbers. 
Its only task is to assess the approximate numerosities of sets. OTS, 
on the other hand, serves object tracking, and ‘takes notice’ of various 
aspects of the tracked objects such as their shape, colour, etc.
The existence of basic mathematical skills was also found in ani­
mals. Interestingly enough, their numerical skills are ratio-dependent, 
suggesting that they are equipped with a predecessor of the human 
ANS system. For instance, it has been demonstrated that “macaque 
monkeys spontaneously match the approximate number of individuals 
  9 Ibid., p. 270.
10 Ibid., pp. 268–269.
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they see to the number of individual voices they hear; and also sum 
up visual and auditory stimuli to estimate their total number, with­
out previous training.”11 This suggests that ANS is an old evolution­
ary device.
There are also other basic problems connected to mathematical 
thinking that generate much interest among neuroscientists. One such 
example is the problem of how the representation of numbers and 
complex counting is possible, given that working memory can store 
up to only 4 visual items. Feigenson speculates that this is possible 
thanks to the flexibility of the working memory – various things can 
count as items: individual objects (representations of exact numbers 
of objects), sets of objects or ensembles (representations of an ap­
proximate number of objects).12 Another problem is the question of 
whether the process of counting depends on eye movement, as some 
suggest. Cavanagh and He claim that eye movement is not essential to 
counting; what is required is a set of attention pointers that individu-
ate targets of interest in the visual field.13
Much attention is also devoted to the relationship between the 
representations of space, time and number. The research in this area 
was stimulated by the discovery of the SNARC effect by Dehaene and 
his team in 1993.14 The experiment setting was as follows: adults were 
to decide whether the displayed number (in Arabic notation) is odd or 
even. In the former case, they were to press the left button, in the latter 
– the right one. The interesting observation was that large numbers led 
to faster key presses on the right-hand side of the space, irrespective 
of whether they were odd or even. This suggested that there is some 
11 Ibid., p. 269.
12 Cf. L. Feigenson, Objects, Sets, and Ensembles, [in:] Space, Time and Number…, 
op.cit., pp. 13–22.
13 Cf. P. Cavanagh, S. He, Attention Mechanisms  for Counting  in  Stabilized  and  in 
Dynamic Displays, [in:] Space, Time and Number…, op.cit., pp. 23–25.
14 Cf. S. Dehaene et al., The Mental Representation of Parity and Number Magnitude, 
“Journal of Experimental Psychology: General” 1993, vol. 122, pp. 371–396; W. Fias, 
J.-Ph. van Dijck, W. Gevers, How Is Number Associated with Space? The Role of Work-
ing Memory, [in:] Space, Time and Number…, op.cit., pp. 133–148.
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relationship between number and space representations. In particular, 
it may be speculated that “mental representation of numbers takes the 
form of a horizontally oriented line which is functionally homeomor­
phic to the way physical lines are represented”15 (the so-called num­
ber line hypothesis). This would explain why large numbers lead to 
the preference of the right-hand side (on the number line, the larger 
the number is, the more to the right it is located). Other SNARC 
effects have also been discovered (associating numbers not only with 
space, but also with temporal duration, objects size or finger location) 
leading, e.g., to Vincent Walsh’s ATOM theory (a theory of magni­
tude), which postulates a single magnitude mechanism that underlies 
the representations of number, space and time. Other researchers dis­
agree with this proposal, suggesting other solutions, such as partially 
shared accumulator systems (Deheane), or the implication of the role 
of the serial position in working memory as an important determinant 
of the interactions between number and space (Fias).16
Altogether, the current research in the neurobiological founda­
tions of mathematical knowledge clearly suggest that there exists an 
inborn – or, to coin a word, an embrained – set of very basic mathe­
matical skills, which – in the context of arithmetic capabilities – con­
sists of OTS and ANS. It must also be noted that similar inborn basic 
skills are implicated in the case of geometrical reasoning (the 2D and 
3D systems).17 For the sake of readability, I limit myself to the arith­
metic capacities, but the conclusions I draw below are applicable, mu-
tatis mutandis, to geometry.
15 W. Fias, J.-Ph. van Dijck, W. Gevers, How is Number Associated with Space? The 
Role…, op.cit., p. 133.
16 See ibid., pp. 139–144.
17 Cf. E.S. Spelke, Natural Number…, op.cit.
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2. The Bumpy Road to Cantor’s Paradise 
or Embodied Mathematics
The inborn or ‘embrained’ arithmetic is quite limited. The question 
thus is, how to get from the OTS and ANS systems to the beautiful 
but complex world of contemporary mathematics, with its differen­
tial equations, Noether rings, Hilbert spaces, non-commutative geom­
etries, quaternions, and infinities. It is no surprise that – at least for 
now – neuroscience has little to say about this problem, and what it 
says is quite speculative.
Even the simplest of issues is controversial: what is the mecha­
nism that enables us to break the ‘number 4’ barrier and acquire the 
competence to use natural numbers? Developmental psychology tells 
us that this process is very slow. At 6 months, children can add and 
subtract one; at two they begin to learn sequences of counting words, 
but do not map the words onto the numbers they represent; half a year 
later they recognize that number words mean more than one; at four, 
children can use fingers to aid adding; at five and a half they under­
stand the commutativity of addition; a year later they understand the 
complementarity of addition and subtraction. More importantly, be­
tween 2. and 4. year, children learn to map number words ‘1’, ‘2’, 
‘3’ and ‘4’ to the corresponding cardinalities one after another, but it 
may take up to six months to move to the next number.18
The first hypothesis of how an individual moves from counting 
from 1–4 to greater numbers has been developed by Carey. She calls 
the process bootstrapping. It consists in realizing that – when a chil­
dren hears ‘five’ – the approximate numerosity of ‘fiveness’ is ac­
tivated (in ANS) and then – on the basis of what the child knows 
about numbers 1–4 (from the workings of the ‘exact’, OTS system) 
– she concludes that 5 is also an exact number. Carey believes, then, 
that the essential move from ‘4’ to ‘5’ results from the interplay be­
tween both core mathematical systems: OTS and ANS. A child learns 
18 Cf. ibid.
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what are exact numbers thanks to the way OTS operates; then, on 
the basis of the approximate representation of ‘fiveness’, a kind of 
inductive step is made, which enables the move to greater natural 
numbers.19
A different proposal has been developed by Piazza.20 She observes 
that the ANS system may be used to represent not only large numbers, 
but also small ones. Moreover, ANS quite quickly becomes very pre­
cise as regards small numerosities. Given the progression in the sen­
sitivity of ANS (the changes to the Weberian ratio), in order to distin­
guish between 2, 3, and larger numbers a ratio of 3:4 is needed. This 
happens at around three years of age, and coincides with the period 
when children become ‘three-knowers’. In other words, Piazza be­
lieves that no interplay between OTS and ANS is needed to ‘break 
the number four threshold’ – the increasing precision of the ANS sys­
tem is sufficient to account for this ability. She supports this hypothe­
sis with the following observations. Firstly, it is true that before chil­
dren learn how to count, their arithmetic abilities are limited to the 
initial four natural numbers; on the other hand, however, there is no 
evidence suggesting that OTS plays any role after counting skills are 
acquired. It is thus difficult to understand how a system that serves 
no purpose in full-blooded counting would be so essential in acquir­
ing the counting skills. Secondly, the fact that it takes some time for 
a child to get from understanding that the word ‘one’ corresponds to 
the number 1, to understanding that the word ‘two’ corresponds to the 
number two, and then again from 2 to 3, and from 3 to 4, may serve 
as an argument against the hypothesis that OTS plays some signifi­
cant role in the development of numerical skills – if it did, it would be 
natural to assume that children learn the association of number words 
with the four corresponding numbers at the same age. Thirdly, there 
is no data suggesting that dyscalculia, or the mental disorder result­
ing in problems with counting, has anything to do with the workings 
19 M. Piazza, Neurocognitive Start­Up Tools…, op.cit., p. 276.
20 Ibid., pp. 275–276.
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of OTS. Finally, experiments with infants and young children suggest 
that some features of OTS may be detrimental in numerical tasks. As 
pointed out above, OTS serves to track objects, ‘taking notice’ of their 
various characteristics (shape, size, colour, etc.): in some tasks, when 
such features (surface or contour length) were pitted against number, 
infants automatically attended to them and failed to recognize num­
ber. “It is extremely difficult to understand how a system that often in­
terferes with numerical tasks might be relevant for learning yet more 
complex numerical representations.”21
At the same time, it must be noted that the functioning of ANS 
alone is insufficient to account for the acquisition of counting skills. 
Even if Piazza is right, and the role of OTS is negligible in this process, 
ANS may only provide exact enough mechanism to learn the counting 
of relatively small numbers. As the Weberian ratio suggests, a 20-year-
old person would be able to distinguish between 7 and 8, but not 8 and 
9, so – if her counting abilities were based solely on ANS – she could 
use exact counting in the range of count from 1 to 8 only. This sug­
gests that even if OTS plays no significant role in breaking the num­
ber 4 threshold on the top of ANS an additional mechanism is needed 
to explain the acquisition of natural number counting skills.
A hypothesis which addresses this problem is defended by Spelke. 
She observes that “children appear to overcome the limits of the core 
number system when they begin to use number words in natural lan­
guage expressions and counting.”22 Children learn the first ten count­
ing words by the age of 2, but initially use them without the intended 
meaning. At 3 they know that ‘one’ means one; at 4 they associate ‘2’, 
‘3’ and ‘4’ with the corresponding numerosities. Then, there is a kind 
of ‘jump’ – children learn quite quickly subsequent numbers. This, 
according to Spelke, requires two things: (a) to understand that every 
word in the counting list designates a set of individuals with a unique 
cardinal value; and (b) to grasp the idea that each cardinal value can 
21 Ibid., p. 280.
22 E.S. Spelke, Natural Number…, op.cit., p. 304.
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be constructed through progressive addition of 1.23 How is this pos­
sible? “For most children, the language of number words and verbal 
counting appears to provide the critical system of symbols for com­
bining the two core systems (i.e., ANS and OTS), and some evidence 
suggests that language may be necessary for this construction.”24
Spelke’s hypothesis that the development of counting skills is 
conditioned and mediated by the acquisition of language, is supported 
by the following pieces of evidence. First, both children and adults in 
remote cultures, whose languages have no words for numbers, recog­
nize their equivalence only approximately when dealing with num­
bers larger than three. Second, an interesting line of evidence comes 
from the study of the mathematical abilities of deaf people. Deaf peo­
ple living in numerate cultures but not exposed to the deaf community 
use a gestural system called homesign; they use their fingers to com­
municate numbers, but only with approximate accuracy. Similarly, 
they perform matching tasks with approximate accuracy.25
Spelke claims further that language continues to play an impor­
tant role in mathematical cognition even after mathematical skills 
are mastered. For instance, educated adults who suffer language im­
pairments have problems with exact, but not approximate numerical 
reasoning. Similarly, when doing exact (but not approximate!) tasks 
adults spend more time with numbers that are difficult to pronounce, 
even if they are presented in Arabic notation. But “if language merely 
scaffolded the acquisition of natural number concepts and abilities, 
and then was replaceable by other symbol systems, one would not 
expect adults to translate Arabic symbols into words for purposes 
of exact computation.”26 Finally, bilingual adults who are taught 
some new mathematical facts in one of their languages have diffi­
culties in the smooth production of exact number facts in the other 
language.
23 Ibid., p. 305.
24 Ibid., p. 305.
25 Ibid., pp. 306–307.
26 Ibid., p. 307.
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To be sure, there are serious doubts as to the extent of the role of 
language in the development of mathematical skills. Rochel German 
and Brian Butterworth believe that there is a “need to distinguish pos­
session of the concept of numerosity itself (knowing that any set has 
a numerosity that can be determined by enumeration) from the pos­
session of representations (in language) of particular numerosities.”27 
Their case rests on the following observations. Firstly, they observe 
that the brain systems involved in numerical processing are ‘some 
distance away’ from the brain areas associated with the production 
of speech. Secondly, they are not convinced by the studies of Ama­
zonian natives who have limited number vocabulary: their apparent 
lack of exact counting skills may result from the fact that they did 
not understand the tasks to be performed. In a latter study, Butter­
worth and colleagues compared arithmetic skills of three groups of 
children: English speaking from Melbourne, and two groups of in­
digenous Australians, speaking Warlpiri and Anindilyakwa. Warlpiri 
“has three generic types of number words: singular, dual plural, and 
greater than dual plural.”28 Anindilyakwa, in turn, “has four possible 
number categories: singular, dual, trial (which may in practice include 
four), and plural (more than three).”29 The tests included: memory for 
a number of counters, cross­modal matching of discrete sounds and 
counters, nonverbal exact addition, and sharing play-dough disks that 
could be partitioned by the child. The results showed no ‘language 
effects’: all three groups performed similarly. This led Butterworth 
et al. to the conclusion that “the development of enumeration con­
cepts does not depend on the possession of a number-word vocabu­
lary. [Therefore] we are born with a capacity to represent exact nu­
merosities, and (...) using words to name exact numerosities is useful 
27 R. Gelman, B. Butterworth, Number  and  Language:  How  Are  They  Related?, 
“TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences” 2005, vol. 9, no.1, p. 6.
28 B. Butterworth, R. Reeve, F. Reynolds, D. Lloyd, Numerical Thought with and with-
out Words: Evidence from Indigenous Australian Children, “Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences” 2008, vol. 105, no. 35, (10.1073 PNAS 080604510), p. 13179.
29 Ibid., p. 13179.
81Neuroscience and Mathematics
but not necessary. When children learn to count, they are learning to 
map from their pre­existing concepts of exact numerosities onto the 
counting word sequence. Conceptual development drives the acquisi­
tion of counting words rather than the other way around.”30
While Butterworth and his team’s reservations seem well- 
-founded, their conclusion seems to go too far. Firstly, the controversy 
does not concern the question of whether all of our mathematical abil­
ities are inborn or else are enabled by language: we are speaking of 
relatively simple arithmetic tasks. It follows, secondly, that the thesis 
that language is crucial in the development of mathematical skills is 
not contested; rather, the extent of its role is at stake. Finally, Butter­
worth’s team criticize the idea that all mathematical representations 
are conditioned on language representations or that – in the develop­
ment of mathematical skills – language is first and precedes the emer­
gence of mathematical mental concepts. However, this argument pre­
supposes a certain view of language as based on an isolated system of 
mental representations. As I shall argue below, there exists a different 
approach to language, one regarding language as not preceding other 
forms of cultural representation, but rather intertwined with them. All 
in all, one should agree with Stanislas Dehaene who remarks:
We all start out on the same rung, but we do not all climb to the 
same level. Progress on the conceptual scale of arithmetic depends 
on the mastery of a toolkit of mathematical inventions. The lan­
guage of numerals is just one of the cultural tools that broaden the 
panoply of available cognitive strategies and allow us to resolve 
concrete problems.31
The claim that it is language and the other ‘cultural tools’ that shape 
our exact mathematical thinking is quite general. The question is, 
30 Ibid., p. 13182.
31 S. Deheane, The Number Sense, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, 
pp. 263–264.
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how exactly the passage from elementary mathematical operations on 
small numbers – via language – to transfinite numbers, axiomatic set 
theory or non-Euclidean geometries is made. There are not many pro­
posals as how to answer this question. The most notable one is George 
Lakoff and Rafael Núñez’s idea of embodied mathematics presented 
in their study Where Does Mathematics Come From?32
Lakoff and Núñez’s work belongs to the approach known as the 
embodied mind paradigm. The basic tenets of this stance are as fol­
lows. The very idea of embodiment boils down to the thesis that the 
human mind and human cognition are decisively shaped by the ex­
periences of our bodies. This is a vague claim that only underlines 
the rejection of other paradigms, such as Cartesian mind­body du­
alism or computationalism (the rough idea that the human brain is 
hardware, and the mind is software implemented in the brain). How­
ever, other claims of the representatives of the embodied mind ap­
proach are more informative. They believe that the human mind is 
a powerful conceptual system shaped by our bodies’ experiences dur­
ing their interactions with the environment. The most basic mental 
concepts or schema, probably derived from the neural motor-con­
trol programs, express spatial relations (such as the Source – Path – 
Goal schema). Since such “image schemas are conceptual in nature, 
they can form complex composites. For example, the word ‘into’ has 
a meaning – the Into schema – that is the composite of an In schema 
and To schema.”33 Further, this mental machinery is capable of pro­
ducing abstract concepts with the use of concrete ones through the use 
of metaphors. In the embodied paradigm metaphors are understood as 
the means for “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in 
terms of another.”34 And so, importance is conceptualized in terms of 
size (“This is a big issue”, “It’s a small issue; we can ignore it”), dif­
32 Cf. G. Lakoff, R. Núñez, Where Mathematics Comes From?, Basic Books, New 
York 2000.
33 Ibid., p. 39.
34 Ibid., p. 5.
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ficulties are conceptualized as burdens (“He is overburdened”, “I’ve 
got a light load this semester”), etc.35
Each such conceptual metaphor has the same structure. Each is 
a unidirectional mapping from entities in one conceptual domain to 
corresponding entities in another conceptual domain. As such, con­
ceptual metaphors are part of our system of thought. Their primary 
function is to allow us to reason about relatively abstract domains 
using the inferential structure of relatively concrete domains.36
Lakoff and Núñez claim further that it is the mechanism of conceptual 
metaphorization that enables the construction of complex and precise 
mathematical concepts. In the case of arithmetic, they postulate the 
existence of four basic or grounding metaphors: the Arithmetic as Ob­
ject Collection (where the source domain concept of collections of ob­
jects of the same size is mapped to the concept of numbers, the size of 
the collection is mapped to the size of the number, the smallest collec­
tion is mapped to the concept of the unit, while putting collections to­
gether is mapped to the process of addition); the Arithmetic as Object 
Construction (where the source domain concept of objects consisting 
of ultimate parts of unit size is mapped to the concept of numbers or 
the act of object construction is mapped to the concept of arithmetic 
operations); the Measuring Stick metaphor (where physical segments 
are understood as numbers, the basic physical segment as one, and 
the length of the physical segment as the size of the number); and the 
Arithmetic as Motion Along a Path metaphor (where the act of mov­
ing along the path is understood as representing mathematical oper­
ations, point-locations on the path are understood as numbers, etc.).
Lakoff and Núñez claim that those four grounding metaphors 
give rise to the development of basic arithmetic. One begins with in­
nate capacities to ‘deal’ with small numbers (up to 4). In addition, one 
35 Ibid., p. 41.
36 Ibid., p. 42.
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has primary experiences with object collections, object construction, 
physical segmentation and moving along a path. “In functioning in 
the world, each of those primary experiences is correlated with subi­
tizing, innate arithmetic, and simple counting.”37 Those two domains 
are combined through the four metaphors in such a way that the pri­
mary experiences become sources of the metaphors and the domain 
of numbers is the target of the metaphors.
The next step is the conflation among the primary experiences: ob­
ject construction always involves object collection. Placing physi­
cal segments end to end is a form of object construction (…). From 
a neural perspective, [such conflations] involve co-activations of 
those brain areas that characterize each of the experiences. (…) As 
a consequence, an isomorphic structure emerges across the source 
domains (…), which is independent of numbers themselves and 
lends stability to arithmetic.38
The ability of subitizing – found in all normal human beings – leads 
to precise and stable results regarding small numbers; when extended 
with the four grounding metaphors, the precision and stability ex­
tends to all natural numbers. Finally, “the laws of arithmetic (com­
mutativity, associativity and distributivity) emerge first as properties 
of the four source domains, then as properties of numbers via those 
metaphors, since the metaphors are inference-preserving conceptual 
mappings.”39
Lakoff and Núñez use the same ideas to explain the emergence of 
more complex mathematical concepts, such as algebra, logic and set 
theory, real numbers, etc. There is no need to present here all those 
constructions, as they remain highly speculative. It is worthwhile, 
however, to have a look at one example: actual infinity. 
37 Ibid., p. 93.
38 Ibid., pp. 95–96.
39 Ibid., p. 96.
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We hypothesize – Lakoff and Núñez say – that all cases of actual 
infinity – infinite sets, points at infinity, limits of infinite series, in­
finite intersections, least upper bounds – are special cases of a sin­
gle conceptual metaphor in which processes that go on indefinitely 
are conceptualized as having and end and an ultimate result. We 
call this metaphor the Basic Metaphor of Infinity. The target do­
main of the BMI is the domain of processes without end – that is, 
what linguists call imperfective processes. The effect of BMI is to 
add a metaphorical completion to the ongoing process so that it is 
seen as having a result – an infinite thing.40
In the case of BMI, the source domain are the iterative processes in 
which, although they do have a finite number of iterations, the num­
ber is indeterminate. The essential element of the metaphor is, how­
ever, to “add to the target domain the completion of the process and 
its resulting state.”41
The theory developed by Lakoff and Núñez may be criticized in 
a number of ways. One can point out some mathematical errors in 
the book (e.g., the ‘invention’ of ‘the first infinitesimal’). It may also 
be pointed out that Lakoff and Núñez seem to underestimate the role 
of ANS in arithmetic skills acquisition, while overplaying the role of 
OTS. One may even try to dismiss their approach claiming that these 
are ‘just so stories’, without any solid empirical grounds with the ex­
ception of some linguistic insights (e.g., the fact that we speak of 
zero using words which are connected to emptiness, lack, absence or 
destruction, and that number one has connotations with individual­
ity, separateness, wholeness, integrity or beginning).42 Further, Lakoff 
and Núñez’s idea of schemes and concepts as constituting the ‘deep 
structure of language’ may be to some extent mistaken. However, all 
this misses the crucial point. Unlike other theorists, Lakoff and Núñez 
40 Ibid., p. 158.
41 Ibid., p. 158.
42 Ibid., p. 75.
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do offer an account of how to get from the limited innate mathemat­
ical capacities to full-blooded mathematics (even if they do not de­
scribe this process in the flawless way). Moreover, they show how it 
is possible to get to Cantor’s paradise by starting with more concrete 
concepts, which reflects both phylogenetic and ontogenetic trajecto­
ries described in the literature.
All in all, Lakoff and Núñez’s conception is a captivating idea 
and, in particular, their conception of embodiment: mathematical cog­
nition is embodied in the sense that “it is grounded in simulations of 
sensorimotor processes through the use of neural resources that are 
also active in bodily perception and action.” Embodied mathematics 
– in contrast to more modest approaches – does draw a line from the 
workings of OTS and ANS to our mathematical practices. It is a road 
that goes through our concrete bodily experiences as reflected in lan­
guage; in a way, then, one can think of their theory as a concretiza­
tion of Spelke’s bold claim that the road to Cantor’s paradise leads 
through language.
3. On How to Remain in Paradise 
or the Embedded Mathematics
The best way to assess the embodied approach to mathematics is 
to compare it with an alternative. Given that there seems to exist 
a strong link between the acquisition of language and the develop­
ment of mathematical skills, it is advisable to see how the origins of 
mathematical concepts may be explained within different approaches 
to the evolution of language.
Let us begin with the Chomskyan idea of universal grammar. As 
well known, Chomsky claims that some basic grammatical structures 
are hard-wired in the brain: all languages must have a common struc­
tural underpinning. The question is whether the Chomskyan approach 
may be helpful in explaining where mathematics comes from, or, in 
other words, how to get from our inborn mathematical capacities (ANS 
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and OTS) to our actual mathematical practices. It seems to me that the 
answer is a plain ‘no’. There is no route from simple mathematical ca­
pacities to full­blooded mathematics through the assumption that we 
have some hardwired grammatical rules. Moreover, I believe that this 
argument can be generalized: any conception which posits some for­
mal inborn structures (proto-language, universal grammar, proto-lan­
guage) is incapable of paving the way from the embrained mathemat­
ics to Cantor’s paradise. First, it seems that one cannot take advantage 
of such inborn formal capacities to break the ‘number four threshold” 
and, in consequence, to understand how counting to natural numbers 
greater than 4 is possible. One may object here, claiming that if the 
proto­logic or proto­language has a built­in induction mechanism, it 
would explain the move from number 4 to larger numbers. However, 
the problem with breaking the ‘number four threshold’ has little to do 
with induction; the problem is rather how to grasp the idea that num­
bers larger than 4, represented approximately by the ANS system, are 
exact numbers in the same way numbers 1–4 are. Thus, it is rather 
a ‘material’ or ‘substantive’ issue than a formal one. Further, even if 
we assumed that some inborn universal formal structures may explain 
the acquisition of the arithmetic skills, the same cannot hold of geome­
try. It seems, therefore, that Chomsky-like theories of language cannot 
help us in accounting for the development of mathematical thinking.
Fortunately, there exists an alternative explanation of language 
evolution and acquisition. It is advocated by such scholars as Mer­
lin Donald, Michael Tomasello, Michael Arbib and others.43 The fun­
damental observation motivating this stance is that the genetic dif­
ference between the human species and other animals is not so large 
(appox. 1 – 1.2%). This constitutes an argument for the thesis that the 
43 Cf. M. Tomasello, Cultural Origins of Human Cognition, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 2001; M. Tomasello, Why We Cooperate, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass. 2009; M. Arbib, The Mirror System, Imitation, and the Evolution of Language, 
[in:] Imitation in Animals and Artifacts, eds. Ch. Nehavin, K. Dautenhahn, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 2002, pp. 229–280; M. Donald, Imitation and Mimesis, [in:] Per-
spectives  on  Imitation, vol. 2: Imitation,  Human  Development,  and  Culture, eds. 
S. Hurley, N. Chater, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2005, pp. 283–300.
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biological adaptation enabling the flourishing of human culture must 
be relatively ‘small’. In other words, the proponents of the described 
scenario claim that it is impossible to account for the development of 
various aspects of culture (language, morality, science, etc.) by re­
course to a large number of biological adaptations. In particular, Mi­
chael Tomasello believes that:
the 6 million years that separates human beings from other great 
apes is a very short time evolutionary, with modern humans and 
chimpanzees sharing something on the order of 99 percent of their 
genetic material – the same degree of relatedness as that of other 
sister genera such as lions and tigers, horses and zebras, and rats 
and mice. Our problem is thus one of time. The fact is, there sim­
ply has not been enough time for normal processes of biological 
evolution involving genetic variation and natural selection to have 
created, one by one, each of the cognitive skills necessary for mod­
ern humans to invent and maintain complex tool-use industries and 
technologies, complex forms of symbolic communication and rep­
resentation, and complex social organizations and institutions.44
Tomasello further claims that 
there is only one possible solution to this puzzle. That is, there 
is only one known biological mechanism that could bring about 
these kinds of changes in behavior and cognition in so short a time 
(…). This biological mechanism is social or cultural transmission, 
which works on time scales many orders of magnitude faster than 
those of organic evolution.45
This, in turn, is made possible by three forms of learning: imitative, 
instructed and collaborative, which are conditioned by “a single spe­
44 M. Tomasello, Cultural Origins…, op.cit., p. 2.
45 Ibid., p. 4.
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cial form of cognition, namely, the ability of individual organisms 
to understand conspecifics as being like themselves, who have inten­
tional and mental lives like their own.”46
There are a number of facts that underline the distinctive human 
capacity to relate to conspecifics. The strongest such line of argu­
mentation is connected to the differences between humans and other 
primates. In a number of experiments, Tomasello and his colleagues 
have demonstrated that the great apes’ learning differs substantially 
from human ways of cultural transmission. In particular, apes learn by 
emulation (i.e., they grasp only the means-ends structure of an acti-
vity and do not copy the pattern of behaviour), while humans learn 
by imitation and instruction.
These observations suggest that the ability to imitate is one of the 
crucial adaptations in the evolutionary history of humankind. Tied 
with this is the capacity of ‘mindreading’ or ‘intention-reading’. In 
addition, evolution has equipped us in a cluster of emotions (for To­
masello, guilt and shame are the basic emotions for cementing social 
bonds). These adaptations, taken together, are responsible for what 
Tomasello calls human mutualism.47 We not only have the ability to 
take the perspectives of others; we can also take a perspective with 
others. To put it differently, humans not only understand what some 
other individuals do (their intentions), but also do things together 
with them (i.e., we are capable of we­intentionality). This, according 
to Tomasello, is the key for understanding the possibility of cumula­
tive cultural evolution.
A similar evolutionary scenario was sketched by Merlin Don­
ald in relation to the emergence of language. Donald claims that the 
sources of the human ability to use language are based on mimetic 
skills, which evolved some 2 million years ago. He distinguishes be­
tween mimicry, imitation and mimesis. Mimicry is a simple copying 
of some action, with no understanding of its goal. Imitation is more 
46 Ibid., p. 5.
47 Cf. M. Tomasello, Why We Cooperate, op.cit.
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abstract and flexible, as it takes into account the goal of the action. Fi­
nally, mimesis is defined as:
the reduplication of an event for communicative purposes. Mime­
sis requires that the audience be taken into account. It also de­
mands taking a third-person perspective on the actor’s own behav­
iour. Some examples are children fantasy play, the iconic gestures 
used in a social context, and the simulation of a ‘heroic’ death dur­
ing a theatrical performance.48
Mimetic skills are thus founded on the ability to imitate, which in turn 
is conditioned by the mimicry skills.
Donald identifies four main types of mimetic representation, 
which are key to the transmission and propagation of culture: (1) 
reenactive mime, characteristic of role-playing; (2) precise means- 
-end imitation (as in learning how to fry an egg); (3) the systematic re­
hearsal and refinement of skill (as in learning how to drive a car); and 
(4) nonlinguistic gesture (as in learning how to dance). He claims fur­
ther that these mimetic skills were the foundation for the emergence 
of language and all the other forms of culture. He stresses that his pro­
posal differs from the traditional scenarios which condition the emer­
gence of culture on the prior emergence of language (the language 
first theory). According to Donald, some forms of culture, based on 
the mimetic skills, must have preceded language and enabled its evo­
lution (the culture first theory).
Donald’s theory leads to profound consequences. First, he claims 
that the human mind is intimately linked to the society in which it 
flourishes. One can even say that it is co-created by the community. 
The communal practices are constitutive of the human mind, both in 
the phylogenetic and ontogenetic dimensions. Second, language is 
not an individual but a network-level phenomenon: its evolution re­
sembles the evolution of an ecosystem rather than of a single organ­
48 M. Donald, Imitation and Mimesis, op.cit., p. 289.
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ism. Third, it follows that “cognitive neuroscientists are unlikely to 
find an innate language acquisition device, and should redirect their 
investigations toward the powerful analogue processing systems out 
of which language can emerge in group interactions.”49
Another analogous theory – but in the context of neuroscience – 
is advocated by Michael Arbib. He attempts to answer the question 
of what is the neuronal basis for a certain feature of language – pari ty 
– which manifests itself in our ability to recognize what our inter-
locutor wants to say.50 He observes that Broca’s area – traditionally 
considered as the region of the brain responsible for the production 
of speech – is one of the areas in which there is a complex system of 
mirror neurons. Thus, Broca’s area is implicated in the production of 
various multimodal linguistic actions (utilizing the hands, face and 
voice). In connection to this, Arbib formulates the Neuron System 
Hypothesis: the parity condition is fulfilled due to the fact that Bro­
ca’s area has been evolutionarily built upon a perception system re­
sponsible for the recognition and execution of manual actions. Arbib 
believes that the hypothesis is backed by both the arguments resulting 
from neuroimaging experiments (execution and perception of manual 
gestures activate neurons located within or in the proximity of Bro­
ca’s area) and the anatomical facts (it is assumed that the F5 region 
in the macaques brains, where the mirror neurons were discovered, 
is an analogue of the Broadmann 44 area in human brain, which is 
a part of Broca’s area).
Arbib also presents an evolutionary hypothesis pertaining to the 
probable development of mirror neurons. The first stage consisted in 
the emergence of mirror systems dedicated to the perception and ex­
ecution of manual actions. In the second stage, those mirror neurons 
served as the basis for the development of the ability to imitate manual 
gestures: simple forms of such imitation are found in apes, more com­
plex forms are exclusively human. The third stage was the emergence 
49 Ibid., p. 294.
50 Cf. M. Arbib, The Mirror System…, op.cit.
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of pantomimic skills, and the fourth stage led beyond the simple 
reenactment of human behaviour (some gestures were recognized as 
standing for something else, e.g. waving one’s hand was interpreted 
as imitating a flying bird). The fifth stage was the emergence of proto- 
-signs, or conventional gestures which made pantomime more precise 
(e.g., they enabled to distinguish gestures representing birds and the 
process of flying). Finally, the sixth stage resulted in the development 
of proto­language, which emerged through the separation of con­
ventionalized manual, mimic and vocal gestures from pantomime.51
Arbib claims further that if the above sketched evolutionary sce­
nario is sound, the human brain is language-ready, but does not ‘have’ 
language. Thus, we are forced to reject Chomsky’s theory of univer­
sal grammar which is a conception of a brain ‘having language’. This 
conclusion is further reinforced by the following two observations: 
first, the ability to learn and use language is not confined to the spo­
ken language, but embraces a combination of manual, vocal and mi­
metic skills.52 Second, proto-language was based on proto-phrases: 
proto-words functioned as our sentences, not our words.
The major objection against this view of language – at least from 
the Chomskyan perspective – is that it may have problems dealing 
with the poverty of stimulus argument. Let me recall that Chomsky 
suggested his theory of universal grammar partly in response to the 
observation that children – in their development – are not exposed to 
a sufficient number of external stimuli in order to form – solely on 
this basis – a formal grammatical structure; thus, the argument runs, 
at least the most fundamental aspects of the structure must be innate.
The reply of the proponents of the imitation­based account of lan­
guage rests on two theses. On the one hand, they claim that Chomsky 
failed to realize that spoken language is not an isolated system: it is 
a part of, and is based upon, a larger cluster of communication skills, 
51 See ibid.
52 M. Arbib, Mirror Neurons and Language, [in:] Handbook of  the Neuroscience of 
Language, eds. B. Stemmer, H.A. Withaker, Academic Press, London 2006, p. 238.
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embracing, in particular, the language of gestures. Thus, the stimuli 
that need to be taken into account are not limited to vocal ones; to the 
contrary, communication vocal stimuli form just a small part of what 
a child is exposed to in the process of communication.
On the other hand, the mechanism of imitation is a powerful tool 
that – in certain circumstances – may lead to a kind of ‘combinato­
rial explosion’. Giacomo Rizolatti claims that there are two types of 
mirror neuron resonance and, as a result, two types of imitation. The 
high-level resonance is used to mirror the goal of an action, while the 
low-level resonance copies the way of acting. According to Rizolatti, 
only the human brain takes advantage of both mechanisms, which 
enables imitation sensu stricto. In apes and (possibly) other animals 
only high-level resonance is used and this explains apes’ learning by 
emulation only. The utilization of both high-level and low-level reso­
nance plays a key role in the enhancement of the flexibility and stabil­
ity of human social reaction, as it enables – through recombination – 
to use the same patterns of behaviour, learned by imitation, to realize 
different goals, or to realize one goal with different means.53
This theory may also explain the mechanism of ‘novelty’ in math­
ematics, or – if I may call it so – the Meno problem. The possibility 
of discoveries in mathematics are explicable by recourse to two facts. 
First, in order to develop new mathematical concepts, one utilizes the 
mechanism of metaphorization: a new metaphor may lead to the es­
tablishment of new mathematical facts. Second, the fact that we learn 
much of our mathematics through imitation suggests that through the 
combination of previously learned patterns of behaviour, new con­
nections between mathematical means and ends may be established.
Interestingly, there are studies which suggest some close links 
between the conception of language and culture as originating with 
imitation and the ‘embodied’ paradigm as advocated by Lakoff and 
53 Cf. G. Rizolatti, The Mirror  Neuron  System  and  Imitation, [in:] Perspectives  on 
Imitation vol. 1: Mechanisms of  Imitation and  Imitation  in Animals, eds. S. Hurley, 
N. Chater, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2005, pp. 55–76.
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Núñez. Lakoff and Gallese suggest54 that “that the sensory-motor sys­
tem has the right kind of structure to characterize both sensory-mo­
tor and more abstract concepts.”55 Their argument runs as follows. 
First, they observe that simple action concepts such as ‘grasp’ may 
well be characterized at the level of sensory-motor structure. Sec­
ond, they claim that mirror neurons and other premotor and parietal 
neurons are ‘multimodal’, i.e. they respond to more than one mo­
dality. “Such multimodality meets the condition that an action-con­
cept must fit both the performance and perception of the action.”56 
Third, “multimodality is realized in the brain through functional clus-
ters, that is, among others, parallel parietal-premotor networks. These 
functional clusters form high­level units—characterizing the discrete­
ness, high-level structure, and internal relational structure required by 
concepts.”57 Fourth, they argue that in order to understand a concept 
one needs to imagine oneself or someone else doing what the con­
cept refers to. They claim further that imagination is a mental simu­
lation, “carried out by the same functional clusters used in acting and 
perceiving.”58 Therefore, any conceptualization of a concrete concept 
(e.g., grasping) via simulation requires the use of the same functional 
clusters used in the action and perception of grasping. Further,
all actions, perceptions, and simulations make use of neural para-
meters and their values. For example, the action of reaching for an 
object makes use of the neural parameter of direction; the action 
of grasping an object makes use of the neural parameter of force. 
So do the concepts of reaching and grasping. Such neural para­
metrization is pervasive and imposes a hierarchical structure on 
the brain: the same parameter values that characterize the internal 
54 Cf. V. Gallese, G. Lakoff, The Brain’s Concepts: The Role  of  the  Sensory­Motor 
System in Conceptual Knowledge, “Cognitive Neuropsychology” 2005, vol. 22 (3–4), 
pp. 455–479.
55 Ibid., p. 455.
56 Ibid., p. 458.
57 Ibid., p. 458.
58 Ibid., p. 458.
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structure of actions and simulations of actions also characterize the 
internal structure of action concepts.59
The final step of the argument is to move from action and other con­
crete concepts to more abstract ones. In this context, Lakoff and Gal­
lese recall Narayanan’s conception of certain premotor structures 
called X-schemas, which fit the perceptual structure of the motor ac­
tions. Moreover, Narayanan observed that the X-schemas “have ex­
actly the right structure to characterize the collection of concepts that 
linguists refer to as ‘aspect’ – concepts that characterize the structure 
of events and our reasoning about events.”60 In this way we found our­
selves in a known territory – recall that the X-schemas are fundamen­
tal to Lakoff and Núñez’s theory of embodied mathematics. In other 
words, it may be suggested that some version of the imitation-based 
paradigm in the study of language constitutes the neural and evolu­
tionary complement of Lakoff and Núñez’s conception of the embod­
ied mind and embodied mathematics.
It should be added that there is a considerable body of evidence 
linking bodily processes and mathematical cognition. First, “studies 
on neural correlates of hand movements and action understanding 
of hand gestures point to an overlapping circuitry in the prefrontal 
and intraparietal regions with number processing.”61 Second, “studies 
conducted with repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS) 
show excitability of hand muscles during different number process­
ing tasks.”62 Third:
behavioral studies on math learning provide evidence for better 
math learning when instruction is supported with hand gestures; 
59 Ibid., p. 458.
60 Ibid., p. 470.
61 F. Soylu, Mathematical Cognition as Embodied Simulation, [in:] Proceedings of the 
33rd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, eds. L. Carlson, C. Hölscher, 
T. Shipley, Cognitive Science Society, Austin, TX 2011, p. 1213.
62 Ibid., p. 1213.
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higher problem solving performance when non-communicative 
hand gestures are allowed, compared to when hands are restricted; 
and non-communicative hand gestures during problem solving 
provide clues for misconceptions in conceptual understanding of 
arithmetic and algebra.63
The picture resulting from those observations is the following. The 
road from inborn mathematics to full­blooded mathematics leads 
through language. But language itself is not based solely on inborn 
grammatical structures. It is rather a part of a larger whole of com­
munication and culture-generating skills which take advantage of the 
mechanism of imitation. If so, language is deeply rooted, or co-con­
stituted by our social practices. In other words, in addition to being 
embodied (based on our bodily experiences), it is also embedded – it 
crucially depends on our communicating with others. If this is true of 
language, it is also true of our mathematical practices: they are em­
brained, embodied and embedded. Social interactions are not only 
triggers of mathematical concept-construction – they are constitutive 
of our mathematical knowledge.
It must also be stressed that the fact that our mathematics is em­
bedded within social practices helps to explain why our mathemati­
cal practice is highly stable. Lakoff and Núñez claim that “the stabil­
ity of embodied mathematics is a consequence of the fact that normal 
human beings all share the same relevant aspects of brain and body 
structure and the same relevant relations to their environment that 
enter into mathematics.”64 So, their claim is that, because our con­
ceptual metaphors have the same source domain (our bodily experi­
ences represented in the concrete concepts we use), or that the source 
domain is in a way shared, the resulting abstract mathematical con­
cepts must also be shared, which explains why mathematics is so 
63 Ibid., p. 1213.
64 G. Lakoff, R. Núñez, Where Mathematics Comes From, Basic Books, New York 
2000, p. 352.
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stable. There is a defect in this argument: the mechanism of meta­
phorization is such that it enables the development of numerous ab­
stract concepts on the basis of the same concrete concept (as La­
koff and Núñez’s examples clearly show). The question is, then, why 
people, when metaphorizing mathematics, pick the same (or similar) 
metaphors. The answer to this question is provided, I believe, by the 
theory of culture based on imitation. The fact that we learn cultural 
patterns of behaviour (and so also counting, theory-proving, etc.), 
contributes to the stability of our mathematical conceptual scheme: 
we use the same abstract metaphors, because we teach each other 
those metaphors, and we have an inborn capacity to learn in this imi­
tative way and to propagate the learned patterns of behaviour among 
the members of our society.
There are also two philosophical corollaries of the theory sketched 
above. The first is that even if the road to Cantor’s paradise is a bumpy 
one, it resembles more of a highway than a mountain route. Mathe­
matics is not a stand-alone, separate body of knowledge. It is inti­
mately intertwined with all that we call culture. It would be hopeless 
to try to distil the phylogenetic or ontogenetic path of the develop­
ment of mathematical skills while not considering it an aspect of, or 
a ‘fibre’ in, the development of culture in general.
Secondly, the above presented theory – a highly speculative one, 
I admit – represents an interesting example of the use of the crite­
rion of coherence within cognitive science. Neuroimaging data, ex­
periments in developmental psychology, linguistic facts, evolutionary 
scenarios, etc – while taken in isolation – may usually be interpreted in 
a number of ways. However, when put together, they may strengthen 
or reinforce one another. This is, I submit, the case with the theory 
outlined here, in which the findings of neuroscience, linguistics and 
evolutionary theory contribute to a coherent picture of the origins of 
mathematical thinking.
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4. Trimming Plato’s Beard?
In the next two sections of the essay I will attempt to address two chal­
lenges that may be raised against the theory of embrained, embodied 
and embedded mathematics, or – as I like to call it – the 3E theory. 
These are: the problem of the necessity in mathematics, and the prob­
lem of the mathematicity of the universe.65
There is a dimension of mathematical and logical research that 
traditionally poses a challenge to any naturalistic accounts of the on­
tology of mathematical or logical objects. It is well captured in the 
following observation by Jan Łukasiewicz:
Whenever I deal with the smallest logical problems, I always have 
the feeling that I am facing some powerful, incredibly coherent and 
enormously resistant structure. I cannot make any changes within 
it, I create nothing, but working hard I uncover new details, gain­
ing eternal truths.66
Such views as the one expressed by Łukasiewicz above give rise to 
the development of mathematical Platonism (or realism), a view that 
“mathematics is the scientific study of objectively existing mathemat­
ical entities just as physics is the study of physical entities. The state­
ments of mathematics are true or false depending on the properties 
of those entities, independent of our ability, or lack thereof, to deter­
mine which.”67
65 There is one more challenge to the 3E account which I do not discuss here: the 
‘miraculous abilities’ of mathematical prodigies (including idiot savants) and mathe-
matical geniuses. This is a complex issue, but I believe that the challenges it poses 
will ultimately be resolved through neuroscientific investigations. See especially, e.g., 
S. Deheane, The Number Sense, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, 
pp. 129–159.
66 J. Łukasiewicz, W obronie logistyki. Myśl katolicka wobec logiki współczesnej, “Stu­
dia Gnesnensia” 1937, vol. 15.
67 P. Maddy, Realism in Mathematics, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990, p. 21.
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There are many forms of mathematical Platonism. In particular, 
one should distinguish between ontological Platonism (a view per­
taining to the existence of mathematical objects) and semantic Plato­
nism (an epistemological view that mathematical statements are true 
or false). Ontological Platonism is a stronger theory – it implies the 
semantic one, but the opposite implication does not hold. Thus, in 
what follows I shall concentrate on the stronger claim. Arguably, on­
tological Platonism in mathematics, although it comes in various in­
carnations, embraces the following three theses:
(The existence thesis) Mathematical objects (or structures) exist.
(The abstractness thesis) Mathematical objects are abstract, non- 
-spatio-temporal entities.
(The independence thesis) Mathematical objects are independ­
ent of any rational or irrational activities of the human mind. In 
particular, mathematical objects are not our constructions.68
The key question is how the above formulated theses are justified. 
With no pretence to comprehensiveness, I posit that there are three 
kinds of arguments backing mathematical Platonism in its ontologi­
cal version. The first one is the semantic argument, well captured by 
Balaguer, but formulated earlier by Frege:69
(1) Mathematical sentences are true.
(2) Mathematical sentences should be taken at their face value. 
In other words, there is no reason to believe that mathemati­
cal sentences, as they appear, are not what they really are, or 
that there is a deep structure of mathematical sentences which 
differs from their surface structure, of what they seem at their 
face.
68 Cf. Ø. Linnebo, Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics, [in:] The Stanford 




(3) By Quine’s criterion, we are ontologically committed to the 
existence of objects which are values of the variables in the 
sentences we consider true.
(4) We are ontologically committed to the existence of mathemat­
ical objects.
(5) Therefore, there are such things as mathematical objects, and 
our theories provide true descriptions of these things. In other 
words, mathematical Platonism is true.
The second argument defending mathematical Platonism is the in-
dispensability argument, or the Quine/Putnam argument. Maddy sum­
marizes it: “we are committed to the existence of mathematical objects 
because they are indispensable to our best theory of the world and we ac­
cept that theory.”70 And in Putnam’s own words: “mathematics and phys­
ics are integrated in such a way that it is not possible to be a realist with 
respect to physical theory and a nominalist with respect to mathemati­
cal theory.”71 A reconstruction of this argument might appear as follows:
(1) By Quine’s criterion, we are committed to the existence of ob­
jects which our best physical theories speak of.
(2) Our best physical theories are expressed with the use of the 
language of mathematics.
(3) Therefore, we are committed to the existence of mathemati­
cal objects. 
(4) When one is a realist with respect to physical theories, one 
must also be a realist with respect to mathematics.
(5) Therefore, mathematical Platonism is true.
Finally, Gödel’s intuition­based argument may be reconstructed 
in the following way:
70 P. Maddy, op.cit., p. 30.
71 H. Putnam, What Is Mathematical Truth? (1975), reprinted in H. Putnam, Mathema-
tics, Matter and Method, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1979, p. 74.
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(1) The most elementary axioms of set theory are obvious; 
as Gödel puts it, they “force themselves upon us as being 
true.”72
(2) In order to explain (1), one needs to posit the existence of 
mathematical intuition, a faculty analogous to the sense of 
perception in the physical sciences.
(3) Not all mathematical objects are intuitable; but our belief in 
the ‘unobservable mathematical facts’ is justified by the con­
sequences they bring in the sphere controllable by intuition 
and through their connections to already established mathe­
matical truths. As Gödels says, “even disregarding the [intui­
tiveness] of some new axiom, and even in case it has no [intui-
tiveness] at all, a probable decision about its truth is possible 
also in another way, namely, inductively by studying its ‘suc­
cess’ (…). There might exist axioms so abundant in their veri-
fiable consequences, shedding so much light upon a whole 
field, and yielding such powerful methods for solving prob­
lems (...) that, no matter whether or not they are [intuitive], 
they would have to be accepted at least in the same sense as 
any well-established physical theory.”73
Let us consider now whether the 3E account of mathematics de­
fended in this essay has any bearing on the arguments favouring math­
ematical Platonism. Lakoff and Núñez believe that the conception of 
the embodied mathematics puts mathematical Platonism to eternal 
rest. For them, mathematical Platonism is “the romance of mathemat­
ics”, a “story that many people want to be true”; a story that mathe­
matical objects are real, and mathematical truth is universal, absolute, 
and certain. They succinctly reject this view:
72 K. Gödel, What Is Cantor’s Continuum Problem? (1947), reprinted in Philosophy of 
Mathematics, eds. P. Benacerraf, H. Putnam, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
1983, p. 484.
73 Ibid., p. 477.
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The only access that human beings have to any mathematics at all, 
either transcendent or otherwise, is through concepts in our minds 
that are shaped by our bodies and brains and realized physically in 
our neural systems. For human beings – or any other embodied be­
ings – mathematics is embodied mathematics. The only mathemat­
ics we can know is mathematics that our bodies and brains allow 
us to know. For this reason, the theory of embodied mathematics 
(…) is anything but innocuous. As a theory of the only mathemat­
ics we know or can know, it is a theory of what mathematics is – 
what it really is!74
As I read them, Lakoff and Núñez underscore two things. First, 
they put forward an epistemological claim that we have no cogni­
tive access to independent abstract objects, since the only way of 
practicing mathematics is through the concepts “shaped by our bod­
ies and brains.” The problem of the cognition of abstract objects 
has been a subject of controversy since the beginnings of philoso­
phy. Painting with a broad brush, one may claim that two solutions 
have been defended in this context, both already present in Plato: 
that there exists a rational intuition enabling us to contemplate ab­
stract objects or that our access to the abstract sphere is discursive, 
mediated by language. Lakoff and Núñez seem to consider only the 
first option, and dismiss it on the basis of recent findings in neuro- 
science.
Second, they seem to embrace a version of Quine’s criterion: we 
are committed to the existence of those things only, of which our best 
scientific theories speak. They add that the best – or rather: the only – 
theory of mathematical cognition we have is the theory of embodied 
mathematics, and since it does not speak of independent abstract ob­
jects, we have no grounds for postulating their existence. The prob­
lem is that Quine’s criterion – applied to other theories, not necessa-
rily accounting for the nature of mathematics, e.g. our best physical 
74 G. Lakoff, R. Núñez, Where Mathematics Comes From, op.cit., p. 346.
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theories – brings a different outcome: that we are indeed committed 
to the existence of abstract mathematical objects.
To put it differently: it seems that Lakoff and Núñez’s stance does 
not invalidate any of the three arguments in favour of mathematical 
Platonism described above. In order to defeat the semantic argument, 
Lakoff and Núñez would either have to show that mathematical state­
ments cannot be ascribed truth or falsehood (which they do not do); 
or to reject the idea that mathematical statements have no ‘deep struc­
ture’, that they are what they seem at their face (which they do not 
do as well); or to reject Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment 
(which they embrace in their argument). Given the main idea behind 
the embodied approach, i.e. that mathematical concepts are the out­
comes of metaphorization, their ‘best shot’ would probably be the re­
jection of the second claim (that there is no deep structure to mathe­
matical statements). However, the distinction between the surface and 
deep structures of statements hangs together with some conception of 
the form of those expressions. It is the form of an expression that con­
stitutes its deep structure. Thus, were the distinction to survive at all, 
Lakoff and Núñez would need to introduce a very peculiar conception 
of the form of statements which lies beneath mathematical structures, 
one very difficult to imagine given that mathematics is the science of 
structures. Also, Lakoff and Núñez do not address the indispensabil­
ity argument. To do so, they would need either to reject Quine’s cri­
terion; or the thesis that mathematical physics is our best theory of 
the world; or the realist stance towards physical theories. Again, this 
is difficult as they embrace Quine’s criterion themselves and seem to 
be realists with respect to biological theories. Finally, the intuition- 
-based argument seems the easiest to attack from the point of view 
of the embodied paradigm. As we have seen above, human ‘intuitive’ 
mathematical capacities are substantially limited. However, Gödel – 
the proponent of the intuition-based argument – does not claim that 
our intuition is a faculty that gives us access to the entire world of 
mathematical structures. His thesis is that intuition is the source of 
certainty in relation to relatively simple mathematical structures and 
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relations; more complicated mathematical statements are evaluated as 
true because they are justified by commonly accepted mathematical 
methods and have consequences controllable at the intuitive level. Of 
course, Lakoff and Núñez may claim that the intuition Gödel speaks 
of is not an intuition of abstract objects; it is rather the capacity to 
use abstract mathematical concepts, which are ultimately shaped by 
the experiences of our bodies. But this criticism can be softened by 
a modification of Gödel’s argument: instead of speaking of intuition, 
one can simply speak of mathematical experience, even conceived 
of in terms of Lakoff and Núñez’s theory. The crux of Gödel’s argu­
ment, or so I argue, lies somewhere else: mathematical Platonism is 
true, because “there exist axioms so abundant in their verifiable con­
sequences, shedding so much light upon a whole field, and yielding 
such powerful methods for solving problems that, no matter whether 
or not they are [a subject of direct experience], they would have to be 
accepted at least in the same sense as any well­established physical 
theory.” Gödel points to something important here: the full power of 
our abstract conceptions, which lies beyond any intuitive or ‘direct’ 
experience, is clearly visible in the consequences they produce within 
the sphere controllable by experience, as well as in the coherence they 
bring to entire areas of mathematics and the heuristic role they play 
in solving mathematical problems. It is reasonable, therefore, to as­
sume that those highly abstract concepts describe some independently 
existing structures rather than claim that they are just ‘metaphoriza­
tions’ of more concrete concepts. The mathematics we can somehow 
experience directly is only the tip of the iceberg: and when Lakoff and 
Núñez believe that the rest of the iceberg is only an illusion, Gödel 
seems to claim that it is a rock-hard, even if abstract, reality.
All this is not to say that the three arguments supporting mathe­
matical Platonism are irrefutable or incontestable: the heated debates 
in the philosophy of mathematics during the last century are the evi­
dence to the contrary. However, Lakoff and Núñez failed to provide 
a persuasive case against mathematical Platonism. It does not change 
the fact that there exists a tension between the embodied paradigm 
105Neuroscience and Mathematics
and mathematical Platonism: the former stresses that mathematics is 
our construction, when the latter underscores that mathematics is in-
dependent of us. 
5. The Mathematicity of the Universe
Michael Heller introduces the concept of the mathematicity of the 
universe in the following words:
In the investigation of the physical world one method has proved 
particularly efficient: the method of mathematical modeling cou­
pled with experimentation (to simplify, in what follows I shall 
speak of the mathematical method). The advances in physics, since 
it has adopted the mathematical method, have been so enormous 
that they can hardly be compared to the progress in any other area 
of human cognitive activity. This incontestable fact helps to make 
my hypothesis more precise: the world should be ascribed a feature 
thanks to which it can be efficiently investigated with the use of the 
mathematical method. Thus the world has a rationality of a certain 
kind – mathematical one. It is in this sense that I shall speak of the 
mathematicity of the universe.75
According to Heller, to say that the world is mathematical is equi-
valent to the claim that it possesses a feature which makes the math­
ematical method efficient. In the quoted passage, Heller hints at one 
of the aspects in which the mathematicity of the world should be un­
derstood: the Efficiency Thesis. It says that the mathematicity of the 
universe is evident once one considers the enormous success of the 
mathematical method during the last 300 years. The success cannot 
be a pure coincidence, as the efficiency of mathematics in uncovering 
75 M. Heller, Czy świat jest matematyczny?, [in:] idem, Filozofia i wszechświat, Uni­
versitas, Kraków 2006, p. 48.
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the laws of nature seems ‘unreasonable’.76 The argument pertaining to 
the ‘unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics’ is not trivial. As Eu­
gene Wigner observes:
It is true, of course, that physics chooses certain mathematical con­
cepts for the formulation of the laws of nature, and surely only 
a fraction of all mathematical concepts is used in physics. It is true 
also that the concepts which were chosen were not selected arbi­
trarily from a listing of mathematical terms but were developed, in 
many if not most cases, independently by the physicists and reco­
gnized then as having been conceived before by the mathemati­
cians. It is not true, however, as is so often stated, that this had to 
happen because mathematics uses the simplest possible concepts 
and these were bound to occur in any formalism. [Moreover], it 
is important to point out that the mathematical formulation of the 
phy sicist’s often crude experience leads in an uncanny number of 
cases to an amazingly accurate description of a large class of phe­
nomena. This shows that the mathematical language has more to 
commend it than being the only language which we can speak; it 
shows that it is, in a very real sense, the correct language.77
There are some phenomena connected to the use of the mathemati­
cal method that lead to the conclusion that it is some feature of the 
world that must be responsible for the method’s successes. It is often 
the case that mathematical equations describing some aspects of the 
universe ‘know more’ than their creators. The standard story in this 
context is that of Einstein’s cosmological constant. When Einstein 
formulated his cosmological equations on the basis of the newly dis­
covered general relativity theory, he realized that they implied a dy­
namic, expanding universe. In order to ‘stop’ the expansion, he in­
76 Cf. E. Winger, The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sci-
ences, “Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics” 1960, vol. 13(1), pp. 1–14.
77 Ibid., p. 7.
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troduced the cosmological constant. It quickly proved, however, that 
Einstein was ‘wrong’ and his equations were ‘right’: the expansion 
of the universe is a fact.
Another instructive example is given by Wigner. When Heisen­
berg formulated his quantum mechanics based on matrix calculus, the 
theory was applicable only to a few idealized problems. Applied to 
the first real problem, of the hydrogen atom, it also proved successful:
This was (...) still understandable because Heisenberg’s rules of 
calculation were abstracted from problems which included the old 
theory of the hydrogen atom. The miracle occurred only when ma­
trix mechanics, or a mathematically equivalent theory, was applied 
to problems for which Heisenberg’s calculating rules were mean­
ingless. Heisenberg’s rules presupposed that the classical equations 
of motion had solutions with certain periodicity properties; and 
the equations of motion of the two electrons of the helium atom, 
or of the even greater number of electrons of heavier atoms, sim­
ply do not have these properties, so that Heisenberg’s rules cannot 
be applied to these cases. Nevertheless, the calculation of the low­
est ener gy level of helium (...) agrees with the experimental data 
within the accuracy of the observations, which is one part in ten 
million. Surely in this case we ‘got something out’ of the equations 
that we did not put in.78
 
The second aspect of the mathematicity of the universe may be called 
the Miracle Thesis. It is possible to imagine worlds which are mathe-
matical in a certain sense, yet non-idealizable. Michael Heller consid­
ers a hierarchy of such worlds. ‘The most non-mathematical’ is a world 
in which no mathematical and logical principles are observed (includ­
ing any stochastic or probabilistic laws). Next, he suggests to consider 
a simplified model of the world: let us assume that the world in ques­
tion may be in one of only two states, represented by ‘0’ and ‘1’. Now:
78 Ibid., p. 10.
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The history of this world is thus a sequence of ‘0’s and ‘1’s. Assume 
further that the world had a beginning, what may be represented by 
a dot at the beginning of the sequence. In this way, we get, e.g., a se­
quence:
.011000101011...
The task of a physicist is to construct a theory which would 
enable us to predict the future states of the world. Such a theory 
would amount to the ‘encapsulation’ of the sequence of ‘0’s and 
‘1’s in a formula (which is shorter than the sequence it encapsu­
lates). Such a formula may be found only if the sequence of ‘0’s 
and ‘1’s is algorithmically compressible. But this leads to a prob­
lem. Such a sequence may be interpreted as a decimal expansion 
of a number in [0,1] and – as well known – the set of algorithmi­
cally compressible numbers belonging to [0,1] is of measure 0 
(…). Thus (…) there is zero-measure chance that a sequences of 
‘0’s and ‘1’, representing our world, belongs to the set of algorith­
mically compressible sequences and so the physicist, who inves­
tigates such a world, may have no rational expectation to discover 
the theory she is looking for.79
This observation underscores ‘the other side’ of the mathematicity 
thesis: not only is universe mathematical (and hence penetrable by 
some mathematical method), but it is also mathematical in a non-ma­
licious way (and hence penetrable by our mathematical methods). 
In connection to the problem of the mathematicity of the world, 
Lakoff and Núñez claim:
No one observes laws of the universe as such; what are observed 
empirically are regularities in the universe (…); laws are mathe­
matical statements made up by human beings to attempt to char­
acterize those regularities experienced in the physical universe. 
(…) What [the physicists] do in formulating ‘laws’ is fit their hu­
79 M. Heller, Czy świat jest matematyczny…, op.cit., pp. 51–52.
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man conceptualization of the physical regularities to their prior 
human conceptualization of some form of mathematics. All the 
‘fitting’ between mathematics and physical regularities of the phy-
sical world is done within the minds of physicists who compre­
hend both. The mathematics is in the mind of the mathematically 
trained observer, not in the regularities of the physical universe.80
This, again, is an example of bad philosophy. Núñez and Lakoff fail to 
realize the far-reaching consequences of the Efficiency Thesis. What 
they leave unaccounted for are, at least, the fact that the mathematical 
method helped us to conquer the micro-scale phenomena; that equa­
tions often ‘know more’ than their creators; that mathematical models 
are often the basis for formulating qualitatively new predictions, and 
so serve as a powerful heuristic tools. It seems that behind Lakoff and 
Núñez’s observations lies a very simplistic or naïve view of science, 
which rests on the observations of the regularities of real­world phe­
nomena and their generalizations into the mathematically expressible 
laws of physics. What follows, within Lakoff and Núñez’s framework 
one cannot even formulate the Miracle Thesis.
The interesting fact is that a conception of mathematics which 
draws on Lakoff and Núñez’s work may shed some light on the Effi­
ciency Thesis. The argument is quite general. Both our inborn mathe-
matical capacities, as well as our conceptual apparatus have been 
shaped – in the evolutionary process – by our interaction with the en­
vironment. Now, given that our environment is mathematical (in Hel­
ler’s sense of the word), it helps us to understand why our mathemat­
ical concept are efficient in uncovering the laws of the universe. Of 
course, such an argument cannot explain fully the efficiency of mathe-
matics in quantum physics, or the fact that physical equations some­
times ‘know more’ than their creators. However, it may serve to dis­
miss the idea that “all the ‘fitting’ between mathematics and physical 
regularities of the physical world is done within the minds of physicists 
80 Lakoff, Núñez, op.cit., p. 344.
110 Bartosz Brożek
who comprehend both. The mathematics is in the mind of the mathe­
matically trained observer, not in the regularities of the physical uni­
verse.” The mind is mathematical because it is a part of the mathe­
matical universe.
6. The Triple E and the Capital M
We face a twofold problem: how to account for the necessity of math­
ematics on the one hand, and how to explain its efficiency in uncov­
ering the structure of reality on the other. It seems that the 3E theory 
of mathematics described above offers no acceptable answers to these 
questions. I posit, therefore, that it should be amended, and the best 
way to amend it is to take advantage of Karl Popper’s conception of 
three worlds.
In this pluralistic philosophy the world consists of at least three 
ontologically distinct sub-worlds; or, as I shall say, there are three 
worlds: the first is the physical world or the world of physical 
states; the second is the mental world or the world of mental states; 
and the third is the world of intelligibles, or ideas in the objective 
sense; it is the world of possible objects of thought: the world of 
theories in themselves, and their logical relations; of arguments in 
themselves; and of problem situations in themselves.81
One can add: of mathematical relations, functions, sets, etc. I will 
leave aside the numerous objections raised against Popperian theory 
but instead I would like to concentrate on a number of its features 
which I believe to be essential to the discussion pertaining to the view 
of mathematics that is proposed here.
Firstly, world 3 really exists. One should note, however, that Pop­
per defines existence in a special, albeit not unprecedented way: exist­
81 K. Popper, Objective Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1972.
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ing objects have the capacity to influence one another.82 Popper says: 
“The theory itself, the abstract thing itself, I regard as real because 
we can interact with it – we can produce a theory – and because the 
theory can interact with us. This is really sufficient for regarding it as 
real.”83 He develops this thought as follows: “[One need] only think 
of the impact of electrical power transmission or atomic theory on our 
inorganic and organic environment, or of the impact of economic the­
ories on the decision whether to build a boat or an aeroplane”,84 in or­
der to reject the fictitious character of the world 3 objects.
Secondly, the world 3 is autonomous. “By this – explains Popper 
– I mean the fact that once we have started to produce something – 
a house, say – we are not free to continue as we like if we do not wish 
to be killed by the roof falling in.”85 The autonomy of the world 3 is 
connected to its objectivity. Both the autonomy and the object ivity 
are indicated by the fact that “certain problems and relations are un­
intended consequences of our inventions, and that these problems and 
relations may therefore be said to be discovered by us, rather than in­
vented: we do not invent prime numbers.”86 In other words, Popper in­
dicates that any ‘discovery’ within the world 3 may lead to some objec­
tive consequences which are independent of our will. For example, one 
of the consequences of the development of Frege’s logical calculus in 
Begriffschrift was the possibility of constructing the Russell paradox. 
Frege was unaware of this possibility; on the other hand, Russell did 
not invent it, he only ‘discovered’ it. Besides, Popper claims that the 
distinction between ‘invention’ and ‘discovery’ is – in most contexts 
– unimportant, “for every discovery is like an invention in that it con­
tains an element of creative imagination.”87 Be that as it may, the ob­
jectivity of the world 3 is, in Popper’s view, indisputable.
82 Ibid., p. 200.
83 K. Popper, Knowledge and the Body­Mind Problem, Routledge, London 1996, p. 47.
84 K. Popper, Objective Knowledge…, op.cit., p. 159.
85 K. Popper, Knowledge and the Body­Mind Problem…, op.cit., p. 47–48.
86 Ibid., p. 48.
87 Ibid., p. 48.
112 Bartosz Brożek
Thirdly, Popper provides us with an evolutionary explanation for 
the emergence of the world 3. He believes – contra Plato – that the 
entities of the world 3 are not ‘superhuman, divine and eternal’; they 
are the products of the long process of human evolution. The world 3 
is a human product, in the same way as nests and dams are animal pro­
ducts. It is the expression of our adaptation, whose roots lie in our bio-
logy. The essential element of the evolutionary theory of the world 3 
is its emergent character. Popper utilizes the classical understanding 
of emergence: “in the course of evolution new things and events oc­
cur, with unexpected and indeed unpredictable properties; things and 
events that are new, more or less in the sense in which a great work of 
art may be described as new.”88 Emergence leads then to new proper­
ties, which are irreducible to the properties of the underlying system.
One would be mistaken, however, to claim that the Popperian 
thesis that the emergent properties are irreducible is indefeasible. Al­
though Popper stresses the implausibility of a future reductionist ex­
planation of the emergence of life, language or mind, he confesses:
I want to make clear that as a rationalist I wish and hope to un­
derstand the world and that I wish and hope for a reduction. At 
the same time, I think it quite likely that there may be no reduc­
tion possible; it is conceivable that life is an emergent property of 
physical bodies.89
This declaration is highly characteristic of Popper’s ontological the­
ory. Nowhere does he claim that the three-worlds ontology should 
be taken literally. He suggests only that – compared to other onto­
logical conceptions – it is a better, more useful tool of philosophical 
argumentation. The world 3 is a ‘useful convention’. “I would say 
– stresses Popper in Knowledge and the Body­Mind Problem – that 
really the name ‘world 3’ is just a way of putting things, and the thing 
88 K. Popper, J.C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain, Routlege, London 1984, p. 22.
89 K. Popper, Objective Knowledge…, op.cit., p. 292. 
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is not to be taken too seriously. We can speak about it as a world, we 
can speak about it as just a certain region.”90 In another essay he adds:
Whatever one may think about the status of these three worlds – I 
have in mind such questions as whether they ‘really exist’ or not, 
and whether world 3 may be in some sense ‘reduced’ to world 2, 
and perhaps world 2 to world 1– it seems of the utmost importance 
first of all to distinguish them as sharply and clearly as possible. 
(If our distinctions are too sharp, this may be brought out by sub­
sequent criticism).91
 
The world 3 “is a metaphor: we could, if we wish to, distinguish more 
than three worlds.”92 Or: “whether or not you distinguish further re­
gions or worlds, is really only a matter of convenience.”93 In this way, 
Popper tries to say that the conception of the world 3 is a step in the 
right direction. Ultimately, it may transpire that it is better to speak of 
one, two, or forty-seven worlds. It is crucial, however, to realize that 
vis a vis the existing ontological theories, the idea of the world 3 con­
stitutes progress. Put otherwise: the ‘division’ of the reality into three 
worlds is a heuristic device. It helps us to identify real problems and 
to appreciate the role of our theories.
Moreover, I believe that Popper’s conception should be modi­
fied in an important way. Let us observe that for Popper the emer­
gence of the world 3 is genetically connected to the emergence of 
language. Without language, there would exist no such world. Thus – 
given the imitation-based theory of language I sketched above – one 
can argue that the world 3 is founded not only on what goes on in our 
minds, but is co­constituted by our social interactions, as it is through 
the social interactions that some patterns of behaviour become parts 
of our common cultural heritage (i.e. of the world 3). Thus, the main 
90 K. Popper, Knowledge and the Body­Mind Problem…, op.cit., p. 17.
91 K. Popper, Unended Quest, Routlege, London 2002, p. 211.
92 K. Popper, Knowledge and the Body­Mind Problem…, op.cit., p. 25.
93 Ibid., p. 18.
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modification of Popper’s theory I propose is the rejection of the view 
that the world 3 emerges from the world 2 alone. I believe that a bet­
ter hypothesis reads that the world 3 supervenes both on mental states 
(belonging to the world 2) and social interactions (which belong to 
the world 1).
Let us repeat the characteristic features of the world 3: it exists in 
the sense of exercising influence on other objects; it is autonomous, 
yet we created it; and it consists of abstract objects. On this view, the 
tension between the fact that mathematics is independent of us, while 
being our creation, diminishes. In other words, I believe that the Pop­
perian ontology provides an answer to the problem of the necessity 
of mathematics.
Still, on the presented view mathematics is only a part, even if 
a designated one, of the world 3. It means that mathematical objects 
are not sui generis; in this way, the proposed conception of mathemat­
ics escapes the argument from queerness, often raised against various 
kinds of Platonism. According to the argument, were there Platonic 
objects (e.g., values, norms, ideas) they would be queer entities, dis­
similar to anything else we know. Now, when the world 3 embraces 
theories, values, mathematical objects, logical relations, rules, etc, 
they no longer are as queer as mathematical objects or values consid­
ered as sui generis entities.
More importantly, the claim that mathematics forms a part of the 
world 3 is coherent with the imitation-based view of language and 
culture, as so with the 3E conception of mathematics. Our culture-cre­
ating abilities, based – inter alia – on our imitative skills, are instru­
mental not only in producing mathematical knowledge, but all kinds 
of knowledge. Therefore, it is only justified that the products of those 
activities (mathematical theories, ethical directives, physical theories, 
etc.) fall within the same ontological category: the world 3.
The bigger problem is connected to the mathematicity of the 
universe. Here also, however, Popper’s ontology constitutes an in­
teresting philosophical stance. According to Popper, science, in its 
development, asymptotically approaches truth. Truth is, therefore, 
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a regulatory idea of science. We will never end our scientific quest 
claiming that our theories are true. We would have no subjective cer­
tainty regarding their truthfulness even if they were objectively true. 
This means, however, that Popper is – as Stanisław Wszołek puts it 
– ‘a transcendental essentialist’:94 he believes that the universe has 
a structure and our attempts at deciphering it continuously bring bet­
ter results or capture some aspects of the structure of the universe. 
Those attempts are guided by the mathematical method, and hence 
the transcendental essence of the universe must be mathematical. This 
explains the ‘unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natu­
ral sciences’.
Michael Heller frames his reply in a slightly different way:
It is obviously true that genetically our mathematics comes from 
the world: we abstract some of its features. However, one needs 
to carefully distinguish between our mathematics and mathema-
tics as such. Our mathematics (which I also deem ‘mathematics 
with a small m’) has been developed by humans in a long evo­
lutionary process: it is expressed in a symbolic language we in­
vented; its results are collected in our scientific journals, books, 
or computer memory. But our mathematics is only a reflection of 
certain relations or structures, which governed the movement of 
atoms and stars long before biological evolution began. I deem 
those relations or structures mathematics as such (or ‘Mathema-
tics with a capital M’); it is what we think of when we ask, why 
nature is mathematical. The answer to this question, which posits 
that the nature is mathematical because mathematics has been ab­
stracted from nature, turns out helpless, or even naïve, when one 
introduces the distinction between our mathematics and mathe­
matics as such.95
94 Cf. S. Wszołek, Esencjalizm transcendentalny K.R. Poppera, “Zagadnienia Filozo­
ficzne w Nauce” 2002, vol. XXXI, pp. 120–132.
95 M. Heller, Co  to  znaczy,  że  przyroda  jest  matematyczna?, [in:] Matematyczność 
przyrody, eds. M. Heller, J. Życiński, Petrus, Kraków 2010, p. 16.
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Heller’s claim is, then, that mathematics (with the small m) is so ef­
ficient in the process of investigating the universe, because it is a re­
flection of Mathematics (with the capital M), a feature of the universe. 
Moreover, the fact that mathematics does resonate with Mathemat­
ics is not as unreasonable as may seem at first: ultimately, our mathe-
matical theories have been developed in constant interactions with the 
Mathematical universe.
Two things should be stressed here. Firstly, the above remarks are 
not intended to say that our mathematics is in a way identical to some 
part of Mathematics. The idea is only that the Popperian world 3, with 
our mathematical theories, is somehow capable of grasping aspects of 
the Mathematical universe. Secondly, even if the presented conception 
constitutes a philosophical reply to the Efficiency Thesis, it becomes 
powerless in the face of the Miracle Thesis: the universe could have been 
Mathematical in such a way, that the mathematics required to capture 
its structure would be too difficult for any carbon-based creatures to de­
velop. This fact calls for a transcendental, if not theological reflection.
The picture resulting from the above considerations may be 
deemed ‘The Triple E and a Capital M’. I posit the distinction be­
tween:
(1) The ‘embrained’ mathematics, i.e. a set of inborn basic mathe-
matical skills (like ANS and OTS).
(2) The embodied mathematics, i.e. a conceptual system – based 
on our linguistic metaphorical schemes – which enables to ex­
pand human inborn mathematical capabilities.
(3) The embedded mathematics, i.e. a system of socially shared 
patterns of behaviour (concerning performance of various 
mathematical operations), propagated through imitation and 
enabling the stability of our mathematical knowledge.
(4) The transcendent Mathematics (with the capital M), i.e. a fea­
ture of the universe that makes possible the investigation of 
nature with the use of the mathematical method, as well as the 
evolutionary development of the mathematical brain.
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This ‘hierarchy’ fits well the modified Popperian ontological stan ce: 
the three levels of mathematics (‘embrained’, embodied and embed­
ded) give rise to our mathematical theories (with a small m), which 
captures some aspects of Mathematics (with the capital M). It must 
be stressed again that the distinction between the ‘embrained’, em­
bodied and embedded mathematics (and especially between the latter 
two) is only analytical: we create mathematics thanks to our inborn 
abilities, coupled with the creative force of metaphorization en abled 
by language and other culture-creating skills, and sustained over time 
by our tendency to imitate.
Conclusion: Is the Empirical Subject Back?
To repeat: the view of mathematics defended here is that of the 3E 
theory: we began our mathematical journey in phylogeny, and each 
of us begins it in ontogeny, with some inborn mathematical skills, 
which are later enhanced thanks to the development of new concepts 
via metaphorization (or something akin to it) and sustained through 
social interactions. Our road to Cantor’s paradise leads through our 
bodily experiences, but also through our social institutions: mathe­
matics is, in a nontrivial sense, a joint enterprise – not only do many 
people contribute to the development of mathematics, but the ‘small 
m’ mathematics is co-constituted by our shared practices. Thus, one 
may say, there is no mathematics of the empirical subject, but rather 
of empirical subjects. Still, the necessity inherent in mathematics, as 
well as its remarkable efficiency in uncovering the structure of real­
ity, leave us face to face with a mystery; a mystery that calls for onto­
logical explanation and, in some cases, perhaps even for a theological 
one. While further advances in neuroscience and related disciplines 
will inevitably lead to our better understanding of what mathematical 
skills consist in, and – in effect – what mathematics is, some prob­
lems, such as the one summarized by the Miracle Thesis, will remain 
subject to insightful philosophical reflection.
